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What Is To Be Done? A reconsideration of Stan Cohen's 
Pragmatic Utopianism 
 
Bill Munro1 
 
Abstract 
Visions of Social Control (1985) is an important but unconventional work within 
British criminology. Its academic unconventionality is perhaps most clearly 
displayed in the final chapter What is to be Done? in which Cohen appeals to 
criminologists to be intellectual adversaries in projects of demystification and 
institutional reform. While the book’s overall aim is explicitly utopian the 
narrative is one of an underlying pessimism. A question at the heart of Cohen's 
‘pragmatic utopianism’ is whether social science can provide a more effective 
theoretical understanding of the institutions of social control in relation to their 
location in the social and physical space of the city? This paper will outline the 
key arguments of Cohen's Visions of Social Control, offer an account of his 
pragmatic utopianism and consider what a pragmatic utopianism may look like 
under today's changed historical conditions. 
 
So you can understand that our knowledge 
Will be entirely dead, after the point 
At which the gate of the future will be shut. 
Dante, Inferno X 
Introduction 
 
Visions of Social Control (1985) is an important but unconventional work within 
British criminology. Its academic unconventionality is perhaps most clearly 
displayed in the final chapter What is to be Done? in which Cohen appeals to 
criminologists to be intellectual adversaries in projects of demystification and 
institutional reform. However the unconventional strangeness of the work is 
deeper than the unusualness of such a politicised appeal to activism within the 
structure of what appears on the surface to be an academic work. The 
incongruity of Visions of Social Control lies in an antagonism between the book’s 
aims, its ideal if you like, and its definitive narrative. While its overall aim is 
                                                          
1 Bill Munro is Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Sterling, Scotland.  
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explicitly utopian – '[m]y preference is to be pragmatic about short-term 
possibilities but to be genuinely utopian about constructing long-term 
alternatives' (Cohen, 1985: 252) – the narrative is one of an underlying 
pessimism. In this it follows Gramsci’s (1996) appeal for a pessimism of the 
intellect combined with an optimism of the will. This antagonism, alongside the 
work’s unconventional structure, is, I would argue, a strength of the book as a 
whole and not a limitation, as it provides a means of reading what we may 
regard as being the work's moral vision against the very real social constraints 
of what is possible. 
In Stan Cohen's (1979/2013) earlier work The Punitive City: Notes on the 
Dispersal of Social Control, which in many respects lays the foundation of Visions 
of Social Control, he asks the two questions, one pragmatic, one theoretical, 
which lie at the heart of his pragmatic utopianism. The first asks whether the 
new forms of community intervention that emerged in the late 70s and early 
80s, can be clearly distinguished from the old institutions that they were 
intended to replace, or whether they merely reproduced within the community 
the very same coercive features of the older system. The second question asks 
whether social science can provide a more effective theoretical understanding 
of the institutions of social control in relation to their location in the social and 
physical space of the city. In both The Punitive City and Visions of Social Control 
Cohen provides a compelling yet pessimistic answer to the first question. At the 
end of The Punitive City he writes that his argument is tilted towards a rather 
bleak view of social change and the undesirable consequences of the emerging 
social control system. The second question Cohen leaves hanging. It is in this 
question however that an implied utopianism is ambiguously articulated. 
Cohen's punitive city has much in common with Foucault’s (1991) equally 
pessimistic account of the carceral dystopia yet, unlike Foucault's vision, 
Cohen’s narrative offers a brief utopian light within this heart of darkness. When 
Cohen writes about ‘blurring the boundaries’ it is not only the blurring of the 
once clear spatial boundaries of the prison – the spatial logic of an institution as 
thing or object – to the unclear and ambiguous limits of community corrections, 
he writes also about the ambiguity and ingenuity of language, and the blurring 
of meaning in relation to the processes of social control. This slippage from a 
real place to that of a semiotic, or signifying space is what makes The Punitive 
City and Visions of Social Control unique, in the sense that space and the social 
use of space is conceptualised as a problem of syntax. This movement between 
the real and the semiotic outlines the utopian trace both within his own work, 
but also in relation to a broader theme of the emancipatory aspect of social 
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science in general. An area that is central to Cohen's question on whether social 
science can provide a more effective theoretical understanding of the 
institutions of social control in relation to their location in the social and physical 
space of the city. Like Virgil who guided Dante through the gates of hell and 
purgatory in The Divine Comedy, Cohen in The Punitive City and Visions of Social 
Control uses the metaphor of the city to guide his readers through 
contemporary visions of hell and the contradictions between the reality and the 
rhetoric of crime control policies and practices in Western jurisdictions. This 
paper will outline the key arguments of Cohen's Visions of Social Control, offer 
an account of his pragmatic utopianism and consider whether his pragmatic 
utopianism can be developed under today's changed historical conditions. In 
considering this latter question the paper will explore Olin Wright’s (2010) 
model of a ‘real utopia’, as a contemporary lens within criminological discourse 
(see Scott, 2013), which as a framework for an emancipatory social science 
shares Cohen’s concern with seeking to demystify dominant narratives by 
providing a systematic diagnosis of our time, as well as the desire to envision 
viable alternatives.   
 
The Central Argument 
 
The blurring of meaning and the slipping from a real to that of a signifying space 
is a constant theme in Visions of Social Control. Cohen (1985: 13) writes in his 
discussion of the master patterns of social control in Western industrial societies 
that there have been two transformations, 'one transparent, the other opaque, 
one real, the other eventually illusory'. The first of these transformations or 
shifts took place between the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning 
of the nineteenth and laid the foundations of all subsequent systems of social 
control. The first shift was accompanied by increased rationalisation and 
bureaucratisation within the penal system. The increased power of the modern 
nation state meant that punishment was regulated and administered by central 
government agencies, which in turn lead to the growth in the scale of the penal 
infrastructure. Modernisation of the penal system also led to increasing 
professionalism and standardisation within the institutions of punishment. 
Since the 1790s punishment had become increasingly ‘rational’, to use the 
eighteenth century meaning of that term, i.e. based on a normative social 
contract theory. By the late nineteenth century, however, the rationality of 
punishment had taken on a different meaning; here it meant that penalties be 
administered in a rule-governed, routine and impassive fashion (see also 
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Garland 1991). The rule-governed and scientific administration of punishment 
was reflected in the development of rule-governed and scientific explanations 
of crime. The positivist development of classificatory schemes and explanations 
of criminal behaviour as being determined by individual pathology all lay the 
foundations for the development of a scientific penology based on therapy 
where the mind replaced the body as the object of penal repression. The 
increased differentiation and classification of deviants into separate types and 
categories, each with its own body of knowledge and accredited experts, was 
replicated physically by the increased segregation of those deviants into 
asylums, mental hospitals, penitentiaries, reformatories and prisons, the latter 
emerging as the dominant institution for normalising problematic behaviour as 
well as the preferred form of punishment. 
The second transformation, which is the subject of Cohen's book, was 
understood by many people (see Skull 1977; Bottoms, 1983) as representing a 
questioning, or even a reversal of the first transformation, reducing state 
involvement in crime control, replacing prison with 'community alternatives', 
decentralising and diverting deviants away from the criminal justice system, 
reducing professional dominance, re-establishing classical 'justice' principles, 
and reintegrating offenders into the community. Cohen (1979/2013: 1985), as 
did other authors (Mathiesen, 1983; Hudson, 1984) challenged the 
‘decarceration’ thesis that attempted to explain this second transformation and 
investigated the gap between the reality and the rhetoric of this shift in penal 
control (see also Cavadino et al 2013). Cohen argues that this master pattern is 
more illusory than real and is merely the continuation and intensification of the 
first. Evidence shows that state intervention has been strengthened and 
extended, and that both old and new forms of social control have expanded. 
Not only have old and new forms of control increased but the focus of control 
has become dispersed and diffused, and the boundaries between those under 
control and those not under control have become blurred.  
 
The technological paraphernalia previously directed at the 
individual, will now be invested in cybernetics, management, 
systems analysis, surveillance, information gathering and 
opportunity reduction. This might turn out to be the most radical 
form of behaviourism imaginable – prevention of the act of crime 
by the direct control of whole populations, categories and spaces. 
(Cohen, 1985: 147) 
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Cohen describes how, as control mechanisms are dispersed from the prison into 
the community, they penetrate more deeply into the social fabric, blurring the 
boundaries between different types of deviants and between deviants and non-
deviants. It is the boundary blurring and the absorption of the community by 
the control system that, Cohen argues, enables the system to camouflage its 
activities.  
The answer Cohen provides as to whether the new forms of community 
intervention that emerged in the late 70s and early 80s merely reproduced 
within the community the very same coercive features of the older system, is 
pessimistic and offers little means to resist the emerging social control system. 
Cohen's second question asks whether social science can provide a more 
effective theoretical understanding of the institutions of social control and the 
gap between the reality and the rhetoric of those institutions. 
 
A Pragmatic Utopian Social Science? 
 
Cohen’s project of understanding the phenomena of crime and punishment in 
modern society and linking this understanding to a strategy that can facilitate 
progressive reform within the penal system is at the heart of both a critical and 
pragmatic criminology. Cohen’s (1985) preference to be pragmatic about short-
term possibilities and genuinely utopian about constructing long-term 
alternatives follows Nils Christie’s vision which, in abandoning utilitarian 
attempts to change the offender or to inflict a just measure of pain, favours a 
clear moral position that bases its programme within a historical critique of the 
dominant ideologies of social control. From this perspective, discussions on 
utopia are by necessity entangled in debates concerning the relationship 
between history and consciousness, historical understanding and actual social 
practices. This link between history and utopia was fundamental to the 
rehabilitation of the concept of utopia within Marxism by authors such as Ernst 
Bloch. In his writings on utopia, Bloch (1986; 1988) makes a distinction between 
abstract and concrete utopia. For Bloch, abstract utopia is wishful thinking, or a 
form of daydreaming, and as such is not accompanied by the desire to bring the 
dream to realisation; the world in this form of thinking remains as it is. The 
problem of abstract Utopia, according to Bloch, is one of immaturity and a 
consequent tendency to become lost in fantasy and memory rather than being 
oriented to real possibility. Abstract utopia is a form of thinking that is not only 
compensatory in its aim, but has also, according to Bloch, discredited the 
concept of utopia, ‘both in pragmatic political terms and in all other expressions 
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of what is desirable’. In abstract utopianising, the utopian function is only 
immaturely present, and as a consequence it is easily led astray (Bloch, 1986: 
145). In this way social science has the responsibility to be realist and to 
establish what is concrete and possible. Concrete utopia is therefore not 
compensatory but anticipatory, it is directed towards what Bloch calls a ‘Real-
Possible’ future. Bloch calls concrete utopia ‘the power of anticipation’ and is a 
form of wilful thinking. He argues that it embodies the essential utopian function 
of both anticipating and affecting the future simultaneously. While abstract 
utopia may express a compensatory desire it does not express hope; only 
concrete utopia can achieve this. The process of extracting concrete utopia from 
its abstract trappings results in what Bloch describes as the ‘unfinished forward 
dream’ – docta spes, or educated hope. It is a ‘methodical organ for the New, 
an objective aggregate form of what is coming up’ (Bloch, 1986: 157). Concrete 
utopia can be understood as both latency and tendency. It is historically present 
and refers forward to an emergent future. 
Bloch (1988) makes an important distinction between two forms of concrete 
utopia: social utopias where representations are constructed in which there are 
no labouring and burdened people; and natural law, in which there are no 
humiliated and insulted people. This distinction between social and legal utopias 
is mirrored in Cohen (1985: 248) when he writes about ‘doing good’ versus 
‘doing justice’. Cohen uses this distinction to make a similar appeal to focus 
utopian practice on the historical and concrete as opposed to the ideological 
and the abstract as a means of avoiding the ‘theoretical crudity of the idealist 
separation of theory and practice which is so continually striking in the history 
of crime control'. The consequences of such a separation is an ideological 
commitment to either one of the dominant modes of 'doing good' (in the form 
of the rehabilitative models surrounding 'community alternatives'), or 'doing 
justice' (the return of a 'justice model' of penal reform), while ignoring their 
historical and political contexts. 
 
We are told that, instead of giving way to despair, liberals should 
realise that rehabilitation is the only ideology which can be used 
to resist conservative policy and the only one which commits the 
state to care for the offender’s needs and welfare. It is not enough 
for justice-model liberals to talk about the ‘right’ to decent 
conditions and treatment, nor to proclaim humanity as an end in 
itself. This would only open criminal-justice politics to a struggle 
which the powerless are bound to lose. (Cohen, 1985: 247) 
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Cohen (1985: 247-48) argues that while being a persuasive programme – and if 
he were interested in defending traditional liberalism he would have no 
hesitation in joining this campaign – he also would have had no hesitation in 
doing the opposite and attacking rehabilitation in the late sixties and upholding 
the value of justice. He might also have encouraged the Fabian version of 
rehabilitation in Britain at the end of the fifties, supported the Progressives in 
the twenties, as well as the child-saving movement at the end of nineteenth 
century. He may even have joined the ranks of the original asylum and 
penitentiary founders. Cohen outlines the complexity involved in resolving the 
contradictions between what we learn from history and the values and 
principles entrenched in our theories: however, to hold to those values and 
principles despite the historical and political contexts in which we find ourselves 
is to court defeat. Cohen (1985: 248) talks about the persistent assumption 
when faced with such defeat, that theories are always beautiful until the 
barbarians make them ugly. However, it is not the barbarians that make them 
ugly but changed historical circumstances.  
Earlier in Visions of Social Control Cohen argues that such theoretical models 
are not just competing abstract explanations or schools of thought to be 
purchased in the academic supermarket, but that they are connected to a 
corresponding system of power. Norrie (1991) raises a similar concern when he 
considers the re-emergence of the 'justice model' in the 1970s and early 80s. 
Criminology up until that time had taught that 'classical criminology' was part of 
the pre-history of valid knowledge, yet here it was back on the agenda. How was 
this intellectually possible? Are ideas recyclable in such a reductive way as to be 
detached from their original social contexts and applied to new ones? Can 
thought be dictated through the negation of intellectual enquiry and by social 
and political circumstance alone? Norrie argues that there were clear political 
reasons why classicism was making a comeback at that time, but raised serious 
concerns about the uncritical reductionism of such forms of idea formation and 
intellectual practices. In terms of Cohen's 'doing good' distinction, Bottoms 
(1977) also questions the dangers of uncritically adopting discredited models to 
deal with new situations when he writes on the renaissance of dangerousness 
in penal policy in the 1970s. Only a few years before his article, the concept of 
dangerousness would have seemed to him, as to most others concerned with 
penal policy in Britain, to be very remote from the language of debate typically 
used in discussion of penal matters. He argued that the renaissance of 
dangerousness was heavily dependent on the conceptual framework of 
positivism, a perspective at that time on the retreat within academic 
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criminology and sociology. In particular, Bottoms highlighted that the positivist 
endorsement of the scientific was problematic as it returned to a belief that 
crime is a naturalistic category and that the analysis of social meaning attached 
to it could therefore be ignored. Again, the political reasons as to why 
recommendations by a discredited penal philosophy should make a resurgence 
in the late 70s was clear in a resurgence of conservative anti-rehabilitation 
which dominated penal policy at that time. As Cohen (1985: 147) notes, the 
'renaissance of the concept of dangerousness in contemporary penology 
depends on the decline of the rehabilitative ideal'. Yet despite this, these ideas 
continued to influence the so called 'progressive' rehabilitation debates 
surrounding 'what works' during the 1990s to the present. What links both the 
'doing good' and the 'doing justice' models is that the 'notion of progress is 
always present in the sense that things can obviously be better' (Cohen, 1985: 
89). Organisations which try to implement each model start with their own 
interests and generate stories (based on their respective ideologies) that are in 
turn 'located in a particular social structure or political economy'. Although not 
explicitly presented as such, the 'doing good' and the 'doing justice' models 
contain, respectively, the conservative totalising utopias of social stability and 
law and order. 
Utopian ideas therefore cannot be made through specifying the content of 
the good society or the just society, as content is dependent on social 
conditions. The wish images of the justice model or the rehabilitative model can 
be discussed individually only according to the degree to which present 
conditions allow for their realisation. What is required therefore is not content, 
but instead, what Bloch (1988: 7) terms a ‘topos of an objective real possibility’. 
In other words, one must not offer a picture of utopia in a positive manner. Any 
attempt to describe or portray utopia in a simple way, i.e., it will be like this, 
should be avoided in order to guard against ‘the cheap utopia, the false utopia, 
the utopia that can be bought’ (Bloch, 1988: 11). On the content of the utopian 
‘there is no single category by which utopia allows itself to be named’ (Bloch: 
1988: 7). At the heart of Cohen's book, as there is in Bloch’s, is the imperative 
‘Thou shalt not make a graven image’. 'Much self-consciously intellectual work 
is needed if we are to wake up from the dream of beautiful theories untouched 
by the pragmatics of power' (Cohen, 1985: 248). 
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Utopia and the City  
 
As mentioned earlier, when Cohen writes about ‘blurring the boundaries’ it is 
not only the blurring of the once clear spatial boundaries that separated a prison 
from a community or the classificatory boundaries that separate deviants from 
non-deviants; he writes also about the ambiguities and cunning of language in 
this process. Boundary blurring is a result of how we talk about control systems 
and their mechanisms and it is how we talk about them that enables the system 
to camouflage its activities. The role of language in the blurring of boundaries is 
mirrored in Stan Cohen’s own work when he blurs the social and physical space 
of the city into representational space and imaginary space. The slippage from 
real space to that of a semiotic or signifying space is carried out in chapter six in 
his discussion of Utopia: 
 
Cities, then, have never been just places, almost as soon as they 
were invented, they spawned a phantom version of themselves; 
an imaginative doppelganger that lived an independent life in the 
imagination of the human species at large. In other words, they 
stood for something. In the ancient world and then again with the 
re-emergence of city life in the later middle ages, the city tended 
to be conceived as a metaphor of order. The patterning of the city, 
its spatial arrangements, hierarchies, functional specifics, served 
as a mirror image of what the wider social reality could and should 
be like. (Cohen, 1985: 206) 
 
Cohen is writing not only about the influence of language and syntax in how we 
structure the world but how there is a functional unity between a system of 
signs and human experience situated on an empirical and historical terrain. In 
other words, spaces of representation are mental inventions (codes, signs, 
‘spatial discourses’, utopian plans, imaginary landscapes, and even material 
constructs such as symbolic spaces, particular built environments, paintings, 
museums) that imagine new meanings or possibilities for spatial practices (see 
also Harvey, 1990). Cohen argues that the semiotic effects, the meaning-
constructions of imaginary representations of the city, are anchored in the 
coercive realities of a concrete historical society itself.  
Earlier in the chapter Cohen writes that the beginning and end of the 
nineteenth century marked two utopian moments in the history of crime 
control. At the beginning of the first transformation of the master patterns the 
founders of the American and European penitentiary system were confident 
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that they had not only found a solution to the crime problem, but one that 
would also lead to a better society. An explicit utopian thinking not only 
informed their design but also was reflected in the faith in scientific progress in 
the new 'science' of criminology which also emerged at that time. Although such 
optimistic views on the abilities of science and technology to solve social 
problems and create a new social order came under assault from more 
pessimistic narratives within the social sciences, an optimistic, utopian element 
in crime control thinking has always been a constant trope, 
 
the countervision of order, regulation and security which will 
replace the imminent threat of breakdown and chaos. This vision 
appeared in the early penitentiary movement, in the idealistic 
excesses of scientific positivism, in the Continental social-defence 
school and today, in the bland technicist criminology peddled by 
international agencies to the Third World. (Cohen, 1985: 202) 
 
The metaphor for the utopia of community corrections, of social stability, the 
fulfilment of private life, law and order, was the city. Hall et al (1978: 145) make 
a similar point with regards to the imaginary power of the city as a metaphor of 
social hygiene when they write that ‘the state of the city’ is ‘in a sense, the tide-
mark of civilisation; it embodies our level of civilisation and the degree to which 
we are successful in maintaining that level of achievement’. The patterning of 
the city, its spatial arrangements and hierarchies not only served as a mirror 
image of what society could and should be like, but reinforced the idea that 
social problems can be solved merely by reordering physical space. The ordered 
city was a system for holding chaos at bay, an idealised form of the actual city 
where an imaginary order was embodied in every ritual and practice. The 
impending problem of social control was brought alive through this imaginary 
order by the work of planners and visionaries in the form of the closed 
institution. Here then was constructed a working model of what society should 
look like. Cohen draws on Foucault (2001) to show how leprosy and the plague 
provided the models and technologies of control for this imaginary. Leprosy 
through the rituals of exile, banishment and exclusion and the plague through 
the technologies of examination, classification and discipline. The control of 
both diseases left behind the models for the Great Incarcerations. The prison 
was a space of exclusion, but it was also a space within which people were 
observed, partitioned, subject to timetables and disciplines. Here also was a 
form of 'moral architecture' – buildings designed not as ostentatious signs of 
wealth and power, nor as fortresses for defence, but for the fabrication of 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?    107 
 
FOUNDATION VOLUME 
virtue. Power and order in its pure utopian form. Foucault fantasized the 
'punitive city' as the utopia of the early judicial reformers ‘at the crossroads, in 
the gardens, at the side of roads being repaired or bridges built, in workshops 
open to all, in the depths of the mines that may be visited, will be hundreds of 
tiny theatres of punishment’ (Cohen, 1985: 209). However, this utopian fantasy 
was never realised and in its place emerged the disciplinary society where 
Foucault 'visualised “panopticicm” as a generalised principle, extended and 
dispersed throughout the social network' (Cohen, 1985: 209). For Foucault, the 
city was not a place for other metaphors but a powerful spatial metaphor itself, 
a metaphor of 'geopolitics' (city, archipelago, maps, streets, topology, vectors, 
landscapes) that he used to describe the dispersal of discipline.  
While the utopian ideal of order and control had never passed out of 
existence, its imaginary representations have. Cohen asks what are the utopian 
after images of the emerging control system? Here he draws on Mumford's 
vision where today's good city in the form of a collective human machine is 
haunted by its dehumanised dark shadow, the invisible machine of the modern 
technocratic state. The power of this new imaginary, or imaginaries, does not 
draw from its visible parts but from 'the minute, intangible assembly of science, 
knowledge and administration' (Cohen, 1985: 210). The invisible machine has 
two contrasting modes of control which fitted its particular imaginaries. The first 
was inclusion: its utopia was of the invisibly controlling city with its metaphors 
of penetration, integration and absorption, and its apparatus of bleepers, 
screens and trackers. The second was exclusion: its utopia was of the visibly 
purified city with its metaphors of banishment, isolation and separation, its 
apparatus of walls, reservations and barriers. The invisible machine is no longer 
an agent for creating the ideal city, but itself becomes the utopia which is 
worshipped and perpetually expanded. Cohen argues that it was in response to 
the horror of the invisible machine that produced the romantic, anti-industrial 
impulses and visions of the 1960s including, paradoxically, the radical 
destructuring movements themselves.  However, 'so invisible was the machine 
that its most benign parts (therapy, social work, humanitarianism) hid its most 
repressive operations’ (Cohen, 1985: 210).  
The anxiety that sustains this imaginary is the fear of what lies 'outside' of its 
representations, 'in the chaos of urban life, in the desolate city streets 
abandoned to the predators, lies the ultimate horror – chaos, disorder, entropy' 
(Cohen, 1985: 210). The city of the present in the streets of which lie the clearest 
mirrors of dystopian imagery (the iconography of crime, violence, pollution) is 
the society of the future. In 1985 Cohen speculated as to whether the invisible 
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machine was breaking down by itself and was being replaced by a new imaginary 
influenced by the fear of what lay 'outside'. Since then much criminological 
debate has focused on the fear of crime as a metaphor for other types of urban 
unease or a displacement of other fears (Young 1999). The increasing public fear 
of what Cohen termed the predator is also informed by what Garland (2001) has 
called the criminology of the dangerous other. This criminology typically depicts 
crime in dramatic and moralising terms and frames its analysis in the language 
of war and ‘zero tolerance’. The relationship of this criminology of the ‘other’ to 
the invisible machine is that while it still draws from the apparatus of science, 
knowledge and administration and the bifurcation between the categories of 
inclusion and exclusion, these categories are now more refined and are focussed 
more minutely on those groups of offender who are politically and 
governmentally demonised and excluded. The utopia for this new imaginary can 
be found in the actuarial language of risk and the probabilistic calculations of 
the risk society. 
 
What is to be done?  
 
In chapter 7 of Visions of Social Control: What is to be Done? Cohen appeals to 
criminologists to be intellectual adversaries in projects of demystification and 
institutional reform and it is here also that he makes explicit the utopian aim of 
his book. That such a dark and pessimistic book drew on the trope of utopia 
might seem to some paradoxical only if we understand utopia in its more 
discredited forms. It is also paradoxical that a work which claims to be 'genuinely 
utopian about constructing long-term alternatives' (Cohen, 1985: 252) should 
consist largely of a sustained critique of utopia. However, it is often in the 
examination of our darker constraints that the trace of utopia appears to guide 
our orientation as a society towards not only the present conjuncture but also 
our future. The quotation by Dante at the start of this article outlines the 
important relationship between knowledge and the future, not in the sense of 
how knowledge may allow us to predict the future (the abstract utopia of 
positivism) but how it allows us to be conscious of and understand our present 
as a society within history and oriented towards an emergent future. This it 
would seem to me to be at the heart of the pragmatic utopianism outlined in 
the book and is similar to what Bloch (1986) called educated hope. It was this 
historically-based and future-oriented hope that linked his question as to 
whether social science can provide a more effective theoretical understanding 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?    109 
 
FOUNDATION VOLUME 
of the institutions of social control with his pragmatism about the possibilities 
of reform. 
Institutional reform, however pragmatic, is not possible without the project 
of demystification promised by the social sciences. Given the importance of 
historical context in the construction of a pragmatic utopianism, it is striking that 
Cohen's question as to whether the social sciences can provide a more effective 
theoretical understanding of the institutions of social control was focussed very 
specifically on those institutions’ relationship to their location in the social and 
physical space of the city. Soja (1989: 15) points out that an overdeveloped 
historical contextualisation of social life within social theory often 'actively 
submerges and peripheralizes the geographical or spatial imagination’. However 
it is the persistent movement from a real historical space to that of a signifying 
or imaginary space throughout Visions of Social Control that not only gives the 
book its analytical strength in distinguishing the real from the illusory, the 
transparent from the opaque, but allows Cohen to avoid the 'theoretical crudity 
of the idealist separation of theory and practice which is so continually striking 
in the history of crime control' (Cohen, 1985: 248). As we have seen, one of the 
consequences of such a crude separation of theory and practice is an ideological 
commitment to what Cohen (1985: 248) called ‘beautiful theories’, theories 
which in themselves often contain traces of conservative utopias. Cohen's 
utopia lies not in the dreams of the future but in the waking up from such 
dreams. He argues that the semiotic effects of such dreams mask the coercive 
realities of a concrete historical society.  
Cohen's ability to link the spatial with the historical in order to separate the 
concrete from the imaginary is close to Michel Foucault's (1986) notion of 
heterotopias. Like Cohen, Foucault's utopias do not have a content and cannot 
be developed into programmes of change. Heterotopias, according to Foucault, 
are the spaces in which we live and in which the erosion of our lives, our history, 
occurs. Unlike the totalising Utopias of social stability and law and order, 
heterotopias are heterogeneous spaces; in other words, spaces which are 
irreducible to one another and not fully superimposable on to one another. 
Unlike the law and order Utopia these spaces are messy, ill-constructed, 
disorganised and chaotic yet also provide the context where the dominant 
fantasies can be resisted and remodelled according to different patterns of 
action and forms of construction. Like Cohen's pragmatic utopianism, it is not to 
be found in the beautiful theories of justice or rehabilitation, but in the 
resistance to the dominant fantasies of the system. The task for criminologists 
is still to be intellectual adversaries in projects of demystification and 
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institutional reform but under the new historical conditions of today. Today 
there is an incoherent and contradictory range of developments occurring in 
penal policy and practice. O’Malley (1999) argues that this ‘volatility’ which, for 
many, reflects a crisis in the institutions of punishment, has been explained by 
criminologists in different ways: as evidence of the limits of the sovereign state 
(Garland, 1996); as the result of the emergence of neo-liberalism and ‘new right’ 
politics (O’Malley, 1999, 2004); and as a sign of a postmodern disintegration of 
penal modernity and the rehabilitative ideal (Pratt, 2000). Many of these 
themes were captured by Cohen as they first emerged in the late 1970s, early 
80s but now, due to hindsight, can be more clearly seen as influenced by neo-
liberal ideas relating to individual responsibility and discourses on risk (Garland, 
2001). These so called 'new penologies' reflect a reconfiguration of the 
relationship between the individual and the State. More specifically, a shift from 
the modernist/welfare project distinguished by commitment to rehabilitation 
towards one characterised by a focus on managerial efficiency (Feely and Simon, 
2003). 
The continuity of the new penology with what Cohen called the invisible 
machine is its close association with criminological positivism, that is, it has a 
reliance on expert knowledge and ‘knowledge professionals’. Its divergences 
from the invisible machine lies in the technologies of classification, a shift from 
individual to aggregate categories of offenders, a greater focus on preventive 
measures and an emphasis on social segregation (Feeley and Simon, 2003). It 
could perhaps be argued, however, that these new penologies, like the second 
great transformation outlined by Cohen, are merely the continuation and 
intensification of that first transformation that took place between the end of 
the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth and laid the 
foundations of all subsequent systems of social control. State intervention again 
has been strengthened and extended, social control has expanded and 
increasingly dispersed and diffused, and the boundaries between those under 
control and those not become increasingly blurred. What has happened is that 
the mask has finally slipped from the illusory destructuring rhetoric.  
So what does this mean for Cohen’s utopianism with his preference for 
pragmatic short-term possibilities and genuine utopian thinking about 
constructing the long-term alternatives? As mentioned earlier, while the 
utopian ideal of order and control has never changed, its imaginary 
representations have. The new fantasies of the system still require to be 
demystified and resisted and a clear moral position that bases its analysis within 
a historical critique of the dominant ideologies of social control still requires to 
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be developed. However, such a critical project that aims to contribute to and 
influence significant change within the penal system has recently been in 
retreat. As most critical scholars are all-too-painfully aware, although the range 
and scope of writing within critical criminology has expanded, the present 
conjuncture within modern capitalist society has erected major economic, 
political and social constraints on such broad political aims, both in relation to 
intellectual critique and activist involvement. Any commitment to a ‘reflexive’ 
praxis between knowledge and a strategy for radical social change is today seen 
as wildly utopian in the negative sense of that term.  
It is perhaps because of this that there has been a renewed interest in the 
concept of Utopia, not only as a political perspective within recent social science 
discourses, but one that opposes abstract wishful thinking with an empirical or 
realist utopian commitment. Olin Wright (2006, 2010), for example, develops 
the theme of a realist utopia to present a framework for an emancipatory social 
science which seeks both to generate the knowledge necessary for opposing 
human oppression and for enabling the conditions in which human beings can 
live fulfilling lives. From a perspective similar to Cohen’s pragmatic utopianism, 
Olin Wright (2006, 2010) argues that social science still has a role to play in 
demystifying dominant institutional narratives and outlines three fundamental 
tasks for social science: to elaborate a systematic diagnosis and critique of the 
world as it exists; to envision viable alternatives; and to understand the 
obstacles, possibilities and dilemmas of transformation.  Both Cohen and Olin 
Wright’s insights into pragmatic/real utopias also inform Scott’s (2013: 92) 
‘abolitionist real Utopias’. For Scott, the ‘abolitionist real Utopia’ must diagnose 
and critique the power to punish, ‘identifying the hurt, suffering and injuries 
inherent within, and generated through, criminal processes and critically 
reflecting upon the legitimacy of the deliberate infliction of pain’. It must 
advocate for the provision of radical alternatives that engage with the 
possibilities for action within a specific historical conjuncture. Lastly, it must 
have a ‘clear strategy of emancipatory change to reduce social inequalities and 
current penal excess’. Following Cohen’s unstated imperative ‘Thou shalt not 
make a graven image’, Scott (2013: 110) argues against the notion of a 
‘blueprint’ for change but advocates ‘explorations of potentialities that sensitise 
the imagination to what is possible’.  
The utopian focus on the uses of the imagination in rethinking penal 
practices is also explored in different ways in the work of Carlen (2008) were the 
imagination was contrasted with the concept of the imaginary to show how 
various political and populist ideologies on punishment and justice structure a 
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representation, or image, of penal policy and practice (see also Sim (2008); 
Barton, et Al (2007) and Hudson (2008)).  The utopian contrast between the 
imagination and the imaginary is a means of thinking through the impasse 
brought about by the closing off of alternative, more imaginative discourses on 
justice and penal practice within contemporary neo-liberal penality. In a period 
in which alternative ways of being and means of transformation are so opaque, 
positions that in the past were perhaps viewed as moderate and achievable are 
now considered utopian. This is a paradox that Jameson (2005: xii) eloquently 
expressed when he said, ‘there is no alternative to Utopia’. The renewed 
interest in the concept of utopia therefore has less perhaps to do with a greater 
clarity of vision or the existence of an identified agent for social change, and 
more to do with grasping those obstacles and explaining the resilience of the 
present constraints to change. Therefore today, the proscription against any 
actual Utopian effort to create a new society is also a proscription against any 
effort to imagine doing so. To attempt to imagine social change, or in some cases 
even limited reform, outside the trope of utopia is therefore to risk losing not 
only our orientation as a society towards the future but also our present. In 
other words, in not addressing the utopian, we risk becoming a society without 
historical consciousness, a society without history (Jameson, 1994). 
When it comes, the resistance to this de-historicised society and its forms 
will come from those outside the dominant imaginary and who inhabit those 
disorganised and chaotic spaces where the system can be resisted and 
transformed according not only to different patterns, maps and forms of 
construction but also in a different language. As Cohen (1985) reminds us, much 
self-consciously intellectual work is still needed if we are to wake up from the 
dreams of the law and order utopias. 
 
References 
 
Barton, A, Corteen, K., Scott, D and Whyte, D. (2007) Expanding the 
Criminological Imagination Cullompton: Willan Publishing 
Bloch, E. (1986) Principles of Hope Oxford: Blackwell 
Bloch, E (1988) The Utopian Function of Art and Literature Cambridge: MIT Press 
Bottoms, A.E. (1977) ‘Reflections on the Renaissance of Dangerousness’ in 
Howard Journal of Criminal Justice Volume 16 pp 70-96 
Bottoms, A.E. (1983) ‘Neglected Features of Contemporary Penal Systems’ in 
Garland, D. and Young, J. (eds) The Power to Punish London: Heinemann 
WHAT IS TO BE DONE?    113 
 
FOUNDATION VOLUME 
Carlen, P. (ed) (2008) Imaginary Penalities Cullompton: Willan Publishing 
Cavadino, M. Dignan, J. and Mair, G. (2013) (Fifth edition) The Penal System 
London: Sage 
Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of Social Control Cambridge: Polity Press 
Cohen, S. (2013) ‘The Punitive City: Notes on the dispersal of social control’, in 
McLaughlin, E. and Muncie, J. (eds) Criminological Perspectives London: Sage. 
Feely, M. and Simon, J (2003) ‘The New Penology’ in McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. 
and Hughes, G. (eds) Criminological Perspectives (2nd edition) London: Sage 
Foucault, M. (1986) ‘Of Other Spaces’ in Diacritics Volume 16, No. 1 pp 22-27 
Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
Harmondsworth: Penguin 
Foucault, M. (2001) Madness and Civilization Oxon: Routledge. 
Garland, D. (1991) Punishment and Modern Society: A Study in Social Theory 
Oxford: Clarendon Paperbacks 
Garland, D. (1996) ‘The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control 
in Contemporary Society’ in The British Journal of Criminology Volume 36, 
No. 4 pp 445-471 
Garland, D. (2001) The Culture Of Control: Crime and Social Order in 
Contemporary Society Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Gramsci, A. (1996) Letters from Prison London: Pluto 
Hall, S. Critcher, C. Jefferson, T. Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) Policing the 
Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order London: Macmillan Press  
Harvey, D. (1990) The Condition of Postmodernity Oxford: Blackwell 
Hudson, B. (1984) ‘The Rising Use of Imprisonment: The Impact of 
“Decarceration” Policies’ in Critical Social Policy Volume 11 pp 46-59 
Hudson, B. (2008) ‘Re-imagining Justice: Principles of Justice for Divided Societies 
in a Globalised World’ in Carlen, P. (ed) Imaginary Penalities, Cullompton: 
Willan Publishing 
Jameson, F (2005) Archaeologies of the Future: The Desire Called Utopia and 
Other Science Fictions London: Verso 
Jameson, F (1994) The Seeds of Time California: Columbia University Press 
Mathiesen, T. (1983) ‘The Future of Control Systems – the Case of Norway’ in 
Garland, D. and Young, J. (eds) The Power to Punish London: Heinemann 
Norrie, A. (1991) Law, Ideology and Punishment: Retrieval and Critique of the 
Liberal Ideal of Criminal Justice London: Kluwer Academic Publishers 
114    MUNRO 
 
JUSTICE, POWER & RESISTANCE 
O’Malley, P. (1999) ‘Volatile and Contradictory Punishment’ in Theoretical 
Criminology Volume 32 pp 175-195 
Pratt, J. (2000) ‘The Return of the Wheelbarrow Men: or, The Arrival of 
Postmodern Penality?’ in The British Journal of Criminology Volume 40 
pp 127-145 
Scott, D. (2013) ‘Visualising an Abolitionist Real Utopia: Principles, policy and 
practice’ in Malloch, M. and Munro, B. (eds) Crime, Critique and Utopia 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 
Scull, A. (1977) Decarceration: Community Treatment and the Deviant – A 
Radical View New Jersey: Prentice-Hall 
Sim, J. (2008) ‘Pain and Punishment: the Real and the Imaginary in Penal 
Institutions’ in Carlen, P. (ed) Imaginary Penalities Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing. 
Soja, W. (1989) Postmodern Geographies: The reassertion of space in critical 
social theory London: Verso. 
Wright, E.O. (2006) ‘Compass Points’ in New Left Review, Volume 41 pp 93-124 
Wright, E.O. (2010) Envisioning Real Utopias London: Verso 
Young, J. (1999) The Exclusive Society London: Sage
